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Abstract Drug use and drug addiction are severely
stigmatised around the world. Marc Lewis does not
frame his learning model of addiction as a choice
model out of concern that to do so further encour-
ages stigma and blame. Yet the evidence in support
of a choice model is increasingly strong as well as
consonant with core elements of his learning mod-
el. I offer a responsibility without blame framework
that derives from reflection on forms of clinical
practice that support change and recovery in pa-
tients who cause harm to themselves and others.
This framework can be used to interrogate our own
attitudes and responses, so that we can better see
how to acknowledge the truth about choice and
agency in addiction, while avoiding stigma and
blame, and instead maintaining care and compas-
sion alongside a commitment to working for social
justice and good.
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Drug use and drug addiction are severely stigmatised
around the world.1 Cross-cultural studies suggest that
social disapproval of addiction is greater than social
disapproval of a range of highly stigmatised conditions,
including leprosy, HIV positive status, homelessness,
dirtiness, neglect of children, and a criminal record for
burglary [1]. The 1961 UN Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs refers to drug addiction as Ba serious evil for
the individual^ and Ba social and economic danger to
[hu]mankind^ [2]. Our common language also expresses
stigma: people who use drugs are Bjunkies^, mothers
who use drugs are Bcrack moms^, and abstinence is
called Bgetting clean^ – implying, of course, that when
people use drugs they are dirty. Lurid, dark images of
drug use and addiction abound in the media [3].2 More-
over, given that possession and trafficking of many kinds
of psychoactive substances are almost universally
criminalised, the stigma associated with criminal
offending also contributes to the stigma surrounding drug
use and addiction.3
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1 I include alcohol, as well as all common illicit and pharmaceutical
psychoactive substances, in the reference of the term Bdrugs^.
2 For a project aiming to counter stereotypical media images of addicts,
see Aaron Goodman’s photo documentaries of long-term heroin users:
http://outcastsproject.com/ and also http://www.storyturns.org/.
3 The argument for decriminalising all psychoactive substances and
regulating them instead is extremely strong [4]; see too http://www.
countthecosts.org/seven-costs. Moreover, if psychoactive substances
are to be criminalised, there is no valid neurochemical or public
health justification for exempting alcohol, which is associated with
high rates of addiction and harm [5].
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Stigma is a mark of social disgrace. It carries
condemnation and ostracization by society and, typ-
ically, creates corresponding shame and isolation on
the part of the stigmatized person.4 Stigma common-
ly impacts on the self-identity and self-esteem of
drug users and addicts themselves [8] as well as
presenting a psychological obstacle to seeking treat-
ment [9]. It also has concrete practical conse-
quences. In many parts of the world, drug addiction
and drug convictions are formal barriers to
healthcare, housing, benefits, employment, financial
loans, and the right to vote; they may also result in
long-term surveillance, forced labour, and torture
and abuse during detention [10].5 Finally, although
levels of drug use are relatively stable across differ-
ent sectors of society, drug addiction and conviction
rates are not equally distributed, but fall dispropor-
tionately on individuals who are otherwise vulnera-
ble and disadvantaged, such as people who come
from underprivileged socioeconomic backgrounds,
have suffered from childhood abuse and adversity,
struggle with mental health problems, or are mem-
bers of minority ethnic groups or other groups sub-
jected to prejudice and discrimination [10–16]. As a
result, they bear a disproportionate share of the
burden of the stigma and associated consequences
surrounding drug use.
Why are drug users and addicts subjected to stigma
and harsh treatment? No doubt a full explanation de-
pends on a variety of complicated historical, socio-
political and economic forces. But from an ideological
perspective, we must also recognise how much these
attitudes and policies resonate with the moral model of
addiction which was dominant in the first half of the
twentieth Century.
The moral model of addiction has two distinctive
features. First, it views drug use as a choice, even
for addicts. Second, it adopts a critical moral stance
against this choice. Addicts are considered people of
bad character with antisocial values: selfish and
lazy, they supposedly value pleasure, idleness and
escape above all else, and are willing to pursue these
at any cost to themselves or others. In contemporary
Western culture, we typically hold people responsi-
ble for actions if they have a choice and so could do
otherwise, and we excuse people from responsibility
if they don’t. Because the moral model of addiction
sees drug use as a choice, it views addicts as re-
sponsible; because it condemns this choice, it views
them as to blame – potentially deserving of the
stigma and harsh treatment they in fact receive. For
this reason, in so far as the moral model continues to
influence – whether implicitly or explicitly – con-
ceptions of drug use and drug addiction, the preju-
dice and injustices to which drug users and addicts
are subjected around the world may appear
justifiable.
For those who recoil from the attitudes embodied
in the moral model, the disease model of addiction
can appear by contrast to offer a desperately needed
ideological corrective. Our concept of disease is not
precise, and may well have different meanings and
implications in different contexts of use [17]. How-
ever, with respect to models of addiction, the mean-
ing and implication is relatively clear: BWhen addic-
tion specialists say that addiction is a disease, they
mean that drug use has become involuntary^ [18].
According to the disease model, addiction is a
chronic , re laps ing neurobiologica l disease
characterised by compulsive use despite negative
consequences. Repeated drug use is supposed to
change the brain so as to render the desire for drugs
irresistible: the disease model maintains that addicts
literally cannot help using drugs and have no choice
over consumption. Compulsion can serve to explain
why addicts persist in using despite the harm their
use causes: if they could stop using, they would –
but they can’t, so they don’t [19, 20]. But, as a
result, it also removes responsibility and with it the
potential for blame. The disease model of addiction
can therefore serve to combat any apparent legiti-
macy that the stigma and harsh treatment of drug
addicts might otherwise be perceived to have.6 With
the pernicious influence of the moral model of
4 However, it is important to note that social deviance can sometimes
be a source of positive self-identity and value, especially for those
belonging to a shared subculture [6, 7].
5 As I write this article in autumn 2016, there are reports that over 2500
people have been murdered in the Philippines during the past months,
as part of President Rodrigo Duterte’s explicit policy to eradicate drugs
by killing all those who deal or use them.
6 In The Biology of Desire [21] Marc Lewis suggests that this line of
thought is what drives Nora Volkow, one of the powerful proponents of
the disease model of addiction: BYet her main objective [...] was to
facilitate treatment for people who needed it. Calling addiction a
disease not only mitigates massive volumes of stigma and guilt but
also aims to provide accessible avenues for addicts to get help. This
seems to be her bottom line^.
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addiction in the background, the disease model
emerges as a call for compassion and a force for
social justice and good.7
Strikingly, Marc Lewis rejects both a choice mod-
el and a disease model, offering instead what he
calls a learning model of addiction. In his view, a
choice model invites and offers to legitimate a crit-
ical moral stance: BUnfortunately, the choice model
provides a convenient platform for those who con-
sider addicts indulgent and selfish. If addiction is a
choice, they reason, then addicts are deliberately
inflicting harm on themselves and, more seriously,
on others^ [21]. But a disease model fares no better
according to Lewis, for it wrongly pathologizes both
the brain and the person. It wrongly pathologizes the
brain because, in his view, the brain changes caused
by repeated drug use are not evidence of pathology
but of neuroplasticity: a part of the ordinary process
of learning and habit formation that occurs when the
brain is exposed to reward. It wrongly pathologizes
the person because most addicts do not think of
themselves as having a disease. Nor would it be
good for them were they to do so: self-conceiving
as a helpless victim of a disease and adopting the
Bsick role^ [22] risks placing addicts in a position
whereby they view themselves as dependent on
medical and associated professionals for a Bcure^.8
Yet, as Lewis emphasises, the personal experience
and stories of the majority of people who have
overcome their addiction to whatever degree typi-
cally involve a sense of agency and empowerment,
alongside the fashioning and enacting of a life nar-
rative that makes sense of the past while telling the
story of a different future [21, 24, 25]. Crudely,
addicts must come to want different things and to
make different choices to overcome their addiction.
Anything that helps with this task – pharmacological
interventions that reduce cravings or stabilise pat-
terns of consumption enabling gradual, monitored
reduction; peer support and a sense of belonging;
education and employment opportunities; the sup-
port of friends and family; books, hobbies, new
pleasures; cognitive and psychological therapy; con-
tingency management treatment; narrative self-
understanding – should be used. But, to borrow a
phrase from Lewis, addiction is Buncannily normal^
through and through [21] – not a disease requiring
specialised medical treatment, but a product of ordi-
nary learning and development which can be over-
come through further learning and development, in
the form of personal growth and self-understanding.
I agree with Lewis that addiction is not a disease
– at least given the typical meaning and implica-
tions of that concept. I am also sceptical that, given
the state of our current understanding and evidence,
we are justified in maintaining that the brain chang-
es caused by repeated drug use are correctly clas-
sified as pathological. And I believe Lewis is cor-
rect to emphasise the central importance of a sense
of agency, empowerment, and personal growth and
self-understanding, in overcoming addiction. But I
do not agree that we must reject a choice model of
addiction.
There are two straightforward reasons why. The
first is that the evidence is ever-increasing that,
however hard it is for addicts to control their use,
and however important it is for others to recognize
and respect this struggle, addicts are not in fact
compelled to use but have choice over their con-
sumption in many circumstances. To briefly review
some of this evidence: Anecdotal and first-person
reports abound of addicts (including those with a
DSM-based diagnosis of dependence) going Bcold
turkey^ [13, 18]. Large-scale epidemiological stud-
ies demonstrate that the majority of addicts Bmature
out^ without clinical intervention in their late
twenties and early thirties, as the responsibilities
and opportunities of adulthood, such as parenthood
and employment, increase [13, 16, 26, 27]. Rates of
use are cost-sensitive: indeed, some addicts choose
to undergo withdrawal in order to decrease toler-
ance, thereby reducing the cost of future use [28].
There is increasing evidence that Contingency Man-
agement treatment improves abstinence and treat-
ment-compliance, compared to standard forms of
treatment such as counselling and cognitive-
behavioural therapy, by offering a reward structure
of alternative goods, such as modest monetary in-
centives and small prizes, on condition that addicts
produce clean urine samples [29]. Experimental
studies show that, when offered a choice between
7 As Owen Flanagan puts this point: BThe reclassification [of addiction
as a disease and so Bless voluntary, more unbidden^ than a Bfull-on
sinful life style choice^] aimed to change certain practices of blame and
responsibility^ [17].
8 Research suggests that this is not helpful for promoting recovery:
belief in a disease model of alcoholism correlates with likelihood of
relapse 6 months post-treatment [23].
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taking drugs or receiving money then and there in
the laboratory setting, addicts will frequently choose
money over drugs [30, 31]. Finally, since Bruce
Alexander’s seminal experiment BRat Park^ first
intimated that something similar might be true of
rats [32, 33], animal research on addiction has con-
vincingly demonstrated that, although the majority
of cocaine-addicted rats will escalate self-adminis-
tration, sometimes to the point of death, if no alter-
native goods are available, they will by contrast
forego cocaine and choose alternative goods, such
as saccharin or same-sex snuggling, if available [34,
35].9 In short, the evidence is strong that drug use in
addiction is not involuntary: addicts are responsive
to incentives and so have choice and a degree of
control over their consumption in a great many
circumstances.10
The second reason to maintain a choice model of
addiction is that the process of overcoming addic-
tion through a sense of agency, empowerment, and
personal growth and self-understanding – a process
that Lewis describes in The Biology of Desire [21]
with great care and acuity – itself presupposes that
addicts have choice and a degree of control. Agency
needs to exist to be mobilized: you can only decide
to quit and do what it takes to stop using and change
how you live and the kind of person you are if you
have some choice and control over your use and
your identity. The Buncannily normal^ road away
from addiction is paved by ordinary moments in life
where choices are made, resolve is hardened, and
reflection and narrative is used to understand and
buttress them. Of course, not all interventions that
help addicts make changes involve choice – many
things will always lie outside of our control – but
choice and cognate psychological processes are
nonetheless crucial elements in most if not all ac-
counts of life changes that flow from personal
growth and self-understanding, and it can be impor-
tant and indeed empowering for this to be recog-
nized and acknowledged [21, 37–39].11
9 For discussion of some of the more striking features of this research,
see Pickard and Ahmed [20].
10 For further discussion, see Pickard [36], Pickard and Ahmed [20].
11 Augusten Burroughs’ take on addiction in his book This is How:
Surviving What You Think You Can’t [40] powerfully expresses ele-
ments of both concerns, which I quote at length for a relevant first-
personal perspective (but note that there will, of course, be addicts who
do not share Burroughs’ perspective, as well as elements of the expe-
rience and nature of addiction that are no doubt important but omitted):
BWhat has worked for me is to find something I wanted more than I
wanted to drink, which was a fuck of a lot. This is less a decision than a
discovery. And it’s for this reason that not everybodywill get sober. My
view that the way to stop drinking is to stop drinking is laughably
simplistic on the surface. It’s BJust say no.^ It’s also true. The way to
stop drinking is to want sobriety more. And then when you feel a
craving, feel the craving until it passes. But don’t act on it – any more
than you wouldn’t kill somebody you feel like killing when they cut
you off in traffic. Just because you want something doesn’t mean you
have to have it. I know how infuriating that is to hear. Relapse is the
temper tantrum that you allow yourself to have when you forbid
yourself from drinking. To stop drinking, you stop drinking. You pour
it out right now. Everything else – all the books, therapies, and
programs – are merely hand-holding. They all strike to accomplish
the same thing: to talk you into not drinking. I’m saying, if you want to
stop, you will [...] To be successful at not drinking, a person needs to
occupy the space in life that drinking once filled with something more
rewarding than the comfort and escape of alcohol. This is the thing you
have to find. You might not. Most alcoholics won’t. The truth is that
people who cannot stop drinking are people who, however guilty they
may feel and however dire the consequences, have become so addicted
to the drug and the experience that they prefer it to the remainder of
their lives. While they may truly want to be sober, they want to drink
more. The thought that precedes a relapse – certainly in my case and I
bet in others as well – is, Bscrew it^. Screw it is an idiom that means, BI
no longer care^. Taking a drink is the opposite of powerlessness. It is
taking firm, decisive action to terminate a state of sobriety that feels
less satisfying and less convincing than drinking has felt in the past or
we imagine will feel in the present. [... ]The myth that alcoholics are
powerless and unable in any way to shape the outcome of their
addiction is a fatal, deeply untruthful message. No alcoholic should
feel powerless over alcohol. Those who die were not powerless. They
either chose alcohol or they slid passively into the inevitable outcome
of drinking; they made a decision by choosing to take no action. And
it’s this choice that results in death [...] Ultimately, the treatment for
addiction – until and if there is a successful medication – resides within
the addict. You can’t spend your time waiting for rehab to Bwork^ or
for something to Bfix^ you. These things can – and do – inspire you or
encourage you. You don’t need to take action to stop drinking. Drink-
ing is an action: pouring the vodka into the glass, raising the glass to
your lips. To stop drinking, all you have to do is sit. In 100% of the
documented cases of alcoholism worldwide, the people who recovered
all shared one thing in common, no matter how they did it: They didn’t
to it. They just didn’t do it. You absolutely can stop drinking today,
right now. The question is only, do you want to be sober more than
you want to drink? Very few people can answer this question
truthfully and reply, yes. I hope you’re one of them. Maybe you
are. I didn’t think I was^.
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Recall that the moral model of addiction has
two features. It views drug use as a choice. And
it adopts a critical moral stance against this choice.
Because of the evidence that addicts respond to
incentives and the role of choice and cognate
psychological processes that involve agency in
overcoming addiction, I believe we must accept
the first feature. But that does not mean we must
also accept the second. Just as addicts have
choices with respect to drug use, we have choices
with respect to how we respond to people who use
drugs. In what follows, I offer a framework that
can help us interrogate our own attitudes and
responses, so that we can better see how to ac-
knowledge the truth about choice in addiction,
while maintaining care, compassion and a commit-
ment to social justice and good. The framework
derives from philosophical reflection on my per-
sonal experience working with patients whose be-
haviour causes them and others harm. The key is
to better distinguish our concept of responsibility
from our concept of blame, so that we can ac-
knowledge agency and with it responsibility, with-
out thereby immediately inviting let alone legiti-
mating stigma and blame.
Responsibility without Blame in the Clinic12
My first experience working in a clinical setting
was in a Therapeutic Community for people with
personality disorder and complex needs. Therapeu-
tic Communities are very distinctive environments.
They work by requiring genuine and sustained
personal albeit professional relationships between
clinicians and patients13 and between patients them-
selves. In more conventional healthcare contexts, the
doctor-patient relationship is both formal and hierarchi-
cal; and there is no peer-to-peer engagement. The patient
has a problem they cannot resolve on their own, and
comes to the doctor for the cure. Both the doctor’s
expertise, relative to the patient, and the medical nature
of the clinical setting, serve to create a divide between
them which can help protect doctors from personal
involvement with their patients. There is both a power
imbalance and a kind of emotional distance that struc-
tures the nature of the relationship and is maintained by
the norms governing standard healthcare contexts. Ther-
apeutic communities, by contrast, are informal, commu-
nal, egalitarian environments, that are committed to
flattened hierarchies between clinicians and patients –
all of whom are equally referred to as Bcommunity
members^ – where decision-making and responsibility
for treatment is shared. Authenticity and emotional inti-
macy are central to the relationships between patients
and between clinicians and patients. A great deal of time
is spent together, not only in various forms of group
therapy sessions, but also on everyday social activities
and chores, such as cooking, eating, cleaning, garden-
ing, or going on outings together as a community.
BCommunity^ really is the catch-word here – there is
no retreat to Bprofessional distance^.
As well as having personality disorder, many of our
Community members also suffered from related condi-
tions, such as addictions and eating disorders. Broadly
speaking, these conditions are all what we might call
Bdisorders of agency .^ Core diagnostic symptoms or
maintaining factors of disorders of agency are actions
and omissions: patterns of behaviour central to the na-
ture or maintenance of the condition. For instance, bor-
derline personality disorder is diagnosed in part via
deliberate self-harm and attempted suicide, reckless
12 For further discussion of this framework and related research see
Pickard [37, 38, 41, 42]; Lacey and Pickard [43, 44] explore the
relevance of the framework to criminal justice contexts. For some
interviews and public engagement pieces, see http://www.
hannapickard.com/responsibility-without-blame.html.
13 How precisely to characterise the ideal form of this relationship is a
difficult question. One possibility is to draw on the distinction between
care and attachment as clarified byWonderly [45]: clinicians must care
for patients without becoming attached to them; or, perhaps, by devel-
oping a form of partial or ‘quasi’ attachment only. For further discus-
sion of the nature and efficacy of Therapeutic Communities, see Pearce
and Pickard [46].
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and impulsive behaviour, substance misuse, violence,
and outbursts of anger; addiction is diagnosed via mal-
adaptive patterns of drug consumption; eating disorders
involve eating too much or too little. If a service user is
to improve let alone recover from these disorders, they
must change the diagnostic or maintaining pattern of
behaviour [47]. For instance, service users with border-
line personality disorder must stop self-harming; addicts
need to quit using drugs or alcohol; anorexics must eat.
There are, no doubt, equally central and important cog-
nitive and affective components to all these disorders.
Borderline personality disorder involves instability of
self-image and emotional volatility; addicts may use
drugs and alcohol to deal with negative emotions and
psychological distress; anorexics may have over-valued
ideas about low body weight and express anger and
achieve a sense of control by refusing to eat. Nonethe-
less, actions and omissions are diagnostically central to
disorders of agency: effective treatment must address
these core patterns of behaviour, even if outcome is
improved by an integrative approach that engages with
behaviour alongside cognition and affect.
Patients with personality disorder are notoriously
difficult to treat. Within psychiatry they have long been
stigmatized as the patients Bno one likes^. But quite
generally, people who behave in ways which harm
themselves or others – as addicts and those with eating
disorders also do – are often very challenging for clini-
cians to work with effectively, as the behaviour can
provoke intense emotions and reactions. Within the
clinic where I worked, addictions were regularly
conceptualised as forms of self-harm: unhealthy ways
of coping with negative emotions and psychological
distress, offering relief in the short-term, but at the cost
– often itself recognised or indeed even desired by the
patient – of causing long-term damage and making
things worse. It is extremely difficult to see people you
care for treat themselves with brutal disregard.14 It is
also extremely difficult to see them act in ways which
have a terrible impact on others, especially those who
may be dependent on them and particularly vulnerable,
such as their children. Clinical work requires a good
therapeutic relationship. But what is the right therapeu-
tic attitude to take when patients directly harm
themselves and indirectly harm others, whether through
cutting, drugs, or other means?
Within the Therapeutic Community where I worked,
the clinical staff were very clear about what their attitude
should be, and usually, although of course not invari-
ably, succeeded in achieving it. Community members
were responsible for their actions and omissions and
accountable to the Community for them – self-harm
and harm to others was not accepted – but an attitude
of compassion and empathy prevailed, and they were
not blamed. As a novice clinician, this stance of respon-
sibility without blame, as I was immediately inclined to
describe it, struck me forcefully. And, if I am honest, I
initially had no idea how this stance was so much as
conceptually possible, let alone achievable for myself
within my own clinical practice. I could make sense of
the idea that, despite appearances, a Community mem-
ber who was, for example, misusing drugs and seriously
damaging their health, their relationships, their life and
the lives of those around them, might not be responsible
because their addiction excused them, and hence not to
be blamed. In other words, I could readily invoke a
disease model of addiction, to delegitimize blame by
rendering their actions involuntary and so too the pos-
sibility of attributing any responsibility to them moot.
And I could make sense of the idea that, despite their
addiction, they were responsible, and hence to be
blamed. In other words, I could readily see how the
moral model could be invoked to purportedly legitimize
any blame I or others might feel. But the combination of
responsibility without blame for actions that caused
serious harm – to patients themselves or to others –
struck me as a philosophical and clinical conundrum.
What is the source of this conundrum? Both within
philosophy and within our culture at large, there is a
deep-rooted tendency to link the idea of responsibility
fundamentally to morality, by holding that its point or
purpose is moral evaluation: the assessment of another
and their behaviour as good or bad, right or wrong. In
addition, such moral evaluation is sometimes under-
stood as fundamentally affective in form [48] – embod-
ied and expressed in our feelings towards those whose
actions wemorally condemn. These feelings can include
anger, resentment, hate, indignation, disgust, revulsion,
contempt and scorn, and are often accompanied by
equally hostile thoughts and actions. At its most radical,
the link between responsibility and these sorts of atti-
tudes and expressions might be thought to be constitu-
tive: Bto regard oneself or another as responsible just is
14 As family and friends who care for people with personality and
related disorders of course know even better than clinicians who work
with them.
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the proneness to react to them in these kinds of ways^
[49]. More modestly, to hold another responsible might
be understood to consist in believing that such reactions
would be appropriate or fitting, even if one does not
actually feel or do anything oneself [50–52]. But such
nuances aside, the idea of responsibility to emerge from
this picture links it fundamentally to moral evaluation
via our practice of responding to others with what is in
effect an affective form of blame – a set of hostile
feelings typically accompanied by equally hostile
thoughts and actions.15
Clinical practice offers a corrective to this deep-
rooted tendency. Effective treatment of disorders of
agency – where core symptoms or maintaining factors
involve actions and omissions, including those that
cause harm to the patient or to others – requires clini-
cians to engage with patients as responsible agents with
regard to their behaviour in order to help them to change
[37, 41, 46, 47]. This is because improvement or recov-
ery from disorders of agency requires patients to break
the cycle by doing things differently. As Lewis empha-
sises, the disease model and its corresponding Bsick
role^ do not aid addicts in this process. After all, people
will only try to change what they believe lies in their
power to change [37, 53, 54]. Hence the clinical task
with such patients is not to deny their agency and rescue
them from blame by pathologising their behaviour, but
to work with them and help them to develop their sense
of agency and responsibility – to support and empower
people to make different choices. In the clinic, the
purpose of employing the concept of responsibility is
therefore not fundamentally a form of backwards-
looking moral evaluation, whereby a person is judged
and potentially condemned for their past behaviour.
Rather, the purpose of employing the concept of respon-
sibility is fundamentally forwards-looking, serving to
identify where there exists capacity for change thanks
to the presence of choice and control, and, through
clinical practices of holding responsible and to account,
to motivate and encourage people to break the cycle – to
develop, learn, and ultimately change what they choose
to do and their sense of who they are and can be.
Of course, the exact nature of clinical practices of
holding responsible and to account varies between
therapeutic modalities. But within Therapeutic Commu-
nities, they typically include direct and challenging feed-
back, so that the negative effects of problematic behaviour
on self, others and relationships is made explicit and must
be faced, potentially alongside the imposition of conse-
quences if members nonetheless continue to repeatedly
engage in it (usually with advance warning and the indi-
vidual’s agreement). These consequences inevitably in-
volve a reflective component, whereby the history, cir-
cumstances, and conscious or unconscious psychological
function of the problematic behaviour is explored, in order
to develop a person’s own narrative self-understanding so
that they can better identify what is stopping them from
changing and develop a plan for how to succeed in
future.16 But they may also involve measures that can
potentially feel punitive, such as withdrawal of privileges,
or time-limited suspension from the group.
It is a staple of clinical practice that, because these
forms of holding responsible and to account have the
potential to feel punitive, they must be effected with an
attitude of concern, respect, and compassion, as opposed
to being accompanied by or expressive of any of the
feelings, thoughts or actions constituting an affective
form of blame. For, once again, the point is not to
morally evaluate and condemn, but rather to care for
patients and help them improve and recover. Affective
blame is understood within clinical practice to under-
mine the capacity of responsibility and accountability to
enable change and empower, because of its propensity
to make patients feel rejected, worthless, ashamed and
uncared for, thereby rupturing the therapeutic relation-
ship as well as damaging any sense of hope for the
future they might otherwise have, and, correspondingly,
any motivation or belief that they really can overcome
their difficulties [37, 39]. The clinic thus offers a cor-
rective to the tendency to understand our concept of
responsibility as linked with affective blame, by offering
a clear and established practice of attributing responsi-
bility for problematic behaviour and holding to account
without affective blame, but instead with positive re-
gard, maintaining attitudes such as concern, respect, and
compassion throughout.
Hence reflection on clinical practice brings into sharp
relief a distinction between whether the patient has choice
15 For further discussion of affective blame see Pickard [37, 41, 42].
There is of course a great deal of variation in individual blaming style,
in particular whether it is ‘hot’ and direct in its aggressiveness or ‘cold’
and passive-aggressive.
16 For this reason, although the fundamental purpose of employing the
concept of responsibility in the clinic is forwards-looking, the practice
of doing so yet contains some backwards-looking elements, in so far as
reflective exploration of the past can be used to facilitate change in the
future. For discussion see Pickard [24].
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and a sufficient degree of control over their behaviour to
be appropriately asked to take responsibility and held to
account, and how others respond to patients who are
responsible for behaviour that causes harm during the
process of addressing it and holding them to account.
Community members may be responsible and held to
account for behaving in ways which are harmful, but
without affective blame colouring the attitudes and actions
of those engaging with them throughout this process.17
In effect, the clinical stance of responsibility without
blame charts a course between the moral and disease
models of addiction. On the one hand, like the moral
model, it acknowledges the role of choice in addiction,
thereby opening the door to the possibility of responsibil-
ity. Of course, it is important to recognise that choice and
responsibility are not all or nothing, but come in degrees.
People can have greater or fewer choices genuinely avail-
able to them, and more or less capacity for control. Those,
like many addicts, who come from disadvantaged back-
grounds typically have fewer available choices; equally, in
so far as drug use is a habitual pattern of coping with
negative emotions and psychological distress, the desire
to use will not only be strong but equally serves an
important psychological function. It is therefore extremely
difficult to forego drugs unless and until the underlying
feelings and difficulties are addressed, alternative healthier
coping mechanisms are learned, and more options are
available. For these and other reasons, agency may some-
times be diminished compared to the norm, and responsi-
bility correspondingly reduced. But reduction is not ex-
tinction: choices may be limited and control hard to
achieve, without either being nullified.18
On the other hand, unlike the moral model but like
the disease model, the clinical stance of responsibility
without blame maintains an attitude towards addicts of
care. But it does not achieve this by denying addicts
their agency in order to exculpate them from responsi-
bility, thereby making any improvement or recovery
dependent on a medical Bcure^. Rather it aims to mobi-
lize a sense of agency and empowerment in addicts,
avoiding blame not through conceiving of them as help-
less victims of disease, but through acknowledging and
working with their agency without adopting moralising
or stigmatising attitudes and practices. Undeniably, this
runs counter to many aspects of the current cultural
climate, which both appears to have a near insatiable
appetite for self-righteousness and blame, and – as we
saw at the opening of this article – severely stigmatises
drug users and addicts. But – and this is the key point –
just as those we may find ourselves unthinkingly in-
clined to blame and stigmatise often have a choice over
their behaviour, we have a choice over how we respond.
There are choices on both sides.
In Conclusion: some First Steps towards
Interrogating our Own Attitudes towards Drug Use
and Addiction
Marc Lewis has diagnosed a genuine dilemma: the dis-
ease model is neither credible in the face of the evidence
nor helpful in so far as it disempowers addicts; but, with
the continued influence of the moral model on our think-
ing, a choice model invites blame and stigma by attrib-
uting agency and responsibility to addicts. In response,
he has opted to distance himself from both. But that is an
unstable position given the evidence that addicts respond
to incentives and the importance of agency and respon-
sibility – alongside other factors, to be sure – in over-
coming addiction. We must accept a choice model of
addiction – although the need to contextualise choices
and understand the variety of ways control, agency, and
so too responsibility, may be reduced in addiction is
equally crucial [16, 19, 20, 37, 54, 56–58].19
17 I am of course not claiming that clinicians and community members
alwaysmanage to achieve this stance of responsibility without blame in
practice. Rather, it is a guiding norm or implicit principle of clinical
engagement in certain therapeutic contexts, which is often if not
inevitably achieved. For discussion of some of the factors and tech-
niques facilitating the clinical skill of holding people responsible
without blame, see Pickard [37], Pearce and Pickard [46, 54], Lacey
and Pickard [43, 44].
18 The concept of responsibility employed in the clinic is linked to
choice and control – perhaps because of the power of these ideas to
motivate and enable a sense of agency for change [38, 39]. But for
those who prefer a reasons-responsive account of responsibility [52], it
can be substituted in theory and the basic distinction between respon-
sibility and blame preserved: the key is simply not to link an account of
responsibility to the emotions and attitudes constitutive of affective
blame. For discussion of the idea of degrees of responsibility in relation
to a reasons-responsive account, see Coates and Swenson [55]. For
discussion of how potentially to understand the ways in which choice
and control may be present yet reduced in addiction, see Holton and
Berridge [56] and Henden [57].
19 Note that Lewis himself emphasises the importance of these con-
siderations in relation to choice throughout The Biology of Desire [21],
both tacitly in his recounting of the personal stories of addicts, and
explicitly in his introductory and concluding discussions (see especial-
ly chapters one, eight and nine). For this reason, although he purports to
be hostile to traditional choice models, it is possible he would not be
hostile to a more nuanced choice model thus reconfigured.
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However, accepting a choice model of addiction
incurs a moral burden. Given that it invites blame
and stigma, there is an obligation to ensure they are
rejected. Choice models of addiction ought therefore
to be paired with a practice of interrogating our own
attitudes towards addiction alongside a commitment
to working for social justice. The clinical model of
responsibility without blame opens up this possibil-
ity by better distinguishing our concept of responsi-
bility from our concept of blame, thereby helping to
block any immediate tendency to slide from one to
the other – in theory and in practice. But the hard
task remains, of shifting attitudes and fighting for
social good. I want to conclude by taking one small
step towards this goal, through diagnosing how a
forced choice between the moral model and the
disease model functions to prevent us from
reflecting on what our part is, as a society, in drug
use and addiction.
Suppose we begin by asking a direct question to
challenge the moral model: What precisely is sup-
posed to be wrong with using drugs?20 Throughout
human history, drugs have been used as means to
achieve a host of valuable ends, including at mini-
mum the following: (1) improved social interaction;
(2) facilitated mating and sex; (3) heightened cogni-
tive performance; (4) facilitated recovery and coping
with stress; (5) self-medication for negative emo-
tions, psychological distress and other mental health
problems and symptoms; (6) sensory curiosity –
expanded experiential horizon; and, finally, (7) eu-
phoria and hedonia – in other words, pleasure [60].
Drugs make us feel good, provide relief from suf-
fering, and help us do various things we want to do
better. Given a commitment to basic liberal values,
where individual freedom to pursue a multiplicity of
goods is respected so long as harm to others does
not accrue, it is difficult to see what could possibly
be wrong with using drugs in and of itself [61]. In
other words, as a rule of thumb, drug use becomes
problematic only if it causes the negative conse-
quences characteristic of addiction – the chronic
and severe harms to self and others.21 For the great
majority of people who use drugs, their use never
escalates and gets to this point: consumption is
managed so that the benefits exceed the costs, and
no obvious (or unjustifiable in relation to the bene-
fits) harms are incurred by anyone.
Suppose now we ask a further direct question:
When use escalates to the point of addiction, who
is to be held responsible for the ensuing negative
consequences? According to the moral model, it is
addicts themselves, who are not only responsible
but to blame, as they are considered to be funda-
mentally people of bad character with antisocial
values. According to the disease model, addicts
are neither responsible nor to blame; their condition
is the result of a disease that has taken hold, and so
the negative consequences of drug use are no one’s
fault – in so far as we can Bblame^ anything it is
the disease itself.22 As an advocate of a choice
model of addiction, I do not of course deny that
some responsibility – but, crucially, responsibility
as distinct from blame – lies with addicts them-
selves; although it is important to remember that
there will sometimes be full or partial justifications
or excuses, for example, those related to the need
to contextualise choices and recognise how and
when control may be reduced.23 The point I wish
to emphasise however is that, in placing blame
squarely on addicts or their disease respectively,
both models are united in enabling us to keep the
focus of our attention away from ourselves and our
society, avoiding the question of whether we, as a
society, also collectively bear some responsibility
for drug use and addiction and their consequent
harms.
20 Recall that I count alcohol, as well as all common illicit and
pharmaceutical psychoactive substances, as drugs (see footnote 1);
and that there is no valid neurochemical or public health justification
for distinguishing alcohol and many such pharmaceuticals from illicit
drugs (see footnote 3) – indeed, in some cases (e.g. methamphetamine
and d-amphetamine [59]) there is little neurochemical or experienced
difference between common pharmaceuticals and illicit drugs.
21 BAs a rule of thumb^ because there are of course exceptions, most
poignantly, the tragic cases where typically young and inexperienced
recreational users die due to using drugs cut with toxins, mixing
multiples substances, or taking too high a dose. However, this risk
could be significantly reduced, through decriminalization and regula-
tion ensuring that reliable sources of drugs were available, alongside
adequate public education initiatives providing accurate information on
how to use drugs safely. Carl Hart has argued forcefully for both points
and offers drug safety education on his website; see http://drcarlhart.
com/.
22 Although note for clarity that it is of course consistent with a disease
model to hold that despite not being responsible for current drug use
and its consequences, addicts nonetheless may bear some responsibil-
ity for becoming addicted in the first place.
23 For further discussion of these and related points in relation to
criminal responsibility, see Morse [62].
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Do we collectively bear such responsibility? As
noted above, a disproportionate number of addicts
come from underprivileged socioeconomic back-
grounds, have suffered from childhood abuse and
adversity, struggle with mental health problems,
and are members of minority ethnic groups or
other groups subjected to prejudice and discrimi-
nation. They may experience extreme psychologi-
cal distress alongside a host of mental health
problems apart from their addiction [12], feel a
lack of psychosocial integration [10, 14, 15], and
are at a socioeconomic disadvantage such that they
have severely limited opportunities [10, 11, 13].
These circumstances are central to understanding
addiction in many contexts [16, 19, 20, 36, 54].
Put crudely, the reason is simply that drugs offer a
way of coping with stress, pain, and some of the
worst of life’s miseries, when there is little possi-
bility for genuine hope or improvement and limit-
ed alternative goods on offer. In such circum-
stances, whatever harms accrue from using drugs
must be weighed against whatever harms accrue
from not using them. For this reason, the explana-
tion of addiction and its associated negative con-
sequences must lie in no small part with the
psycho-socio-economic circumstances that cause
such suffering and limit opportunities. And the
existence of these circumstances is a feature of
our society for which we must all collectively take
some responsibility, for we tolerate it.
Both the moral and the disease model of addic-
tion can therefore be seen to function as a psycho-
logical defense – protecting us from focussing our
attention on the existence of these circumstances
and their role in explaining drug use and addiction,
thereby keeping consciousness of our own collec-
tive responsibility for these facts at bay. Perhaps
one reason, then, why we blame and stigmatise
addicts for their choices is that it is more comfort-
able than facing up to aspects of our society which
make drugs – whatever their costs – such a good
option for many of our already vulnerable and
disadvantaged members.24
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